The engine that powers quantum cryptography is the principle that there are no physical means for gathering information about the identity of a quantum system's state (when it is known to be prepared in one of a set of nonorthogonal states) without disturbing the system in a statistically detectable way. This situation is often mistakenly described as a consequence of the "Heisenberg uncertainty principle." A more accurate account is that it is a unique feature of quantum phenomena that rests ultimately on the Hilbert space structure of the theory along with the fact that time evolutions for isolated systems are unitary. In this paper we shall explore several aspects of the information-disturbance principle in an attempt to make it firmly quantitative and flesh out its significance for quantum theory as a whole.
Introduction
Suppose an observer obtains a quantum system secretly prepared in one of two nonorthogonal pure quantum states. Quantum theory dictates that there is no measurement he can use to certify which of the two states was actually prepared. This is well known [18, and refs] . A simple, but less recognized, corollary is that no interaction used for performing such an information-gathering measurement can leave both states unchanged in the process [5] . If the observer could completely regenerate the unknown quantum state after measurement, then-by making further nondisturbing information-gathering measurements on it-he would eventually be able to infer the state's identity after all.
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This consistency argument is enough to establish a tension between information gain and disturbance in quantum theory. What it does not capture, however, is the extent of the tradeoff between these two quantities. In this paper, we shall lay the groundwork for a quantitative study that goes beyond the qualitative nature of this tension. Namely, we will show how to capture in a formal way the idea that, depending upon the particular measurement interaction, there can be a tradeoff between the disturbance of the quantum states and the acquired ability to make inferences about their identity. We shall also explore the extent to which the very existence of this tradeoff can be taken as a fundamental principle of quantum theory-one from which unitary time evolution itself might possibly be derived.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next Section, we lay out a general model (inspired by quantum cryptography [4, 6] ) upon which to formalize various notions of the information-disturbance tradeoff. Section 3 places these ideas within the historical context, comparing them to the standard folklore that quantum mechanical measurements cause "uncontrollable disturbances" and do so because of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle [34, p. 445] . In Section 4, we carry out the calculations necessary to develop one particularly simple tradeoff relation for pure quantum states; this example captures much of the essential physics of the problem. In Section 5, we say what little can be said presently about quantitative tradeoff relations for mixed states. In particular, we point out how a "no-cloning" theorem does not capture the essence of the problem for mixed states. In Section 6, we describe a sense in which Wigner's theorem [42, 2] allows the standard axiom of unitarity for quantum mechanical evolutions to be replaced with the ostensibly weaker one that "eavesdropping on nonorthogonal quantum states causes a disturbance."
The Model
The model we shall base our considerations on is most easily described in terms borrowed from quantum cryptography, from whence it takes its origin. Alice randomly prepares a quantum system to be in either a stateρ 0 or a stateρ 1 . These states, in the most general setting, are described by density operators on an N -dimensional Hilbert space for some N ; there is no restriction that they be pure states, orthogonal, or commuting for that matter. After the preparation, the quantum system is passed into a "black box" where it may be probed by an eavesdropper Eve in any way allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics. That is to say, Eve may allow the system to interact with an auxiliary system (which we shall call her probe)-leaving the probe ultimately in one of two statesρ E 0 or ρ E 1 -so that after the systems have decoupled, she may perform quantum mechanical measurements on the probe itself. Because the outcome statistics of the measurement will then be conditioned upon the quantum state that went into the black box, the measurement may provide Eve with some information about the quantum state and may even provide her a basis on which to make an inference as to the state's identity. After this manhandling by Eve, the original quantum system is passed out of the black box and back into the possession of Alice.
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A crucial aspect of this model is that even if Alice knows the exact manner in which Eve operates-i.e., her probe's initial state and the precise interaction she uses-because the system will have become entangled 3 with the probe, she will necessarily have to resort to a new description of the quantum system after it emerges from the black box, say by someρ A 0 orρ A 1 . That is to say, even if Alice sends a pure state into the black box, a pure state will not emerge out of it; rather it will be mixed. This is simply because, by assumption, Alice does not have access to all the relevant quantum systems. This is where the detail of our work begins. Eve now has the potential to gather information about identity of Alice's preparation, via the alternate states of her probê ρ E 0 orρ E 1 . Meanwhile the statesρ 0 andρ 1 no longer form valid descriptions of Alice's system because it will have become entangled with Eve's ancilla.
The ingredients required to pose a precise tradeoff principle for information gain and disturbance follow from the setup of the model. We shall need:
• a concise account of all probes and interactions that Eve may use to obtain evidence about the identity of the state
• a convenient description of the most general kind of quantum measurement she may then perform on her probe
• a measure of the information or inference power provided by any given measurement, 2 In this respect, the model differs from the standard one in quantum key distribution. There, Eve eventually passes Alice's quantum system on to a third person Bob. Since we are not interested in key distribution per se in this work, such an extra participant would be superfluous. 3 The term "entanglement" was first used by Schrödinger [36] soon after the EPR paper [14] made its appearance. For historical interest, and for the purpose of bringing it to the attention of a wider audience, we point out that Einstein had a fairly clear notion of entanglement in his mind as early as 9 July 1931. This is evidenced by a letter from Ehrenfest to Bohr on that date. See Jammer's article [26] for details.
• a good notion by which to measure the distinguishability of mixed quantum states and a measure of disturbance based on it, and finally
• a "figure of merit" by which to compare the disturbance with the inference.
We describe each of these ingredients in some detail in the subsections below. Finally in Section 2.5, we explore various ways of putting them together.
Evolutions
Since Eve cannot know which of the two quantum states Alice prepared, the most general manipulation she can perform on her newly acquired quantum system is to interact it with another system prepared independently of the particular state coming into the black box. Thus, if the state of the system entering the black boxρ s , s = 0, 1, is a density operator on the Hilbert space H A , the initial state of the joint system consisting of it and Eve's probe will beρ s ⊗σ for some standard density operatorσ on the probe's Hilbert space H E . (There need be no a priori relation between the dimensionalities of H A and H E .)
Interacting the two systems in the most controlled way that Eve possibly can, i.e., through some unitary interactionÛ , leads to the two systems being entangled with only a single quantum state on H A ⊗ H E between them:
After Alice's original system emerges from the black box and is placed back into her hands, her description of it will beρ
where tr E represents a partial trace over Eve's probe. The system in Eve's possession, will likewise afterward be described by a new density operator
where tr A represents a partial trace over Alice's system. The class of evolutions described by Eq. (2) are called "nonselective operations" by Kraus [29] . Note that if |E i is a basis in which the operatorσ is diagonal, then we may write Eq. (2) aŝ
where σ j are the eigenvalues ofσ. Letting the operatorŝ A ij on H A be defined bŷ
and lumping the indexes, i.e., = (i, j), we can write Eq. (4) asρ
Note, furthermore, that the operatorsÂ satisfy the normalization condition
whereÎ A is the identity operator on H A . The content of Kraus's representation theorem is that any set of operatorsÂ satisfying Eq. (7) can be used in Eq. (6) to describe a valid nonselective operation. (A simple proof of this theorem and a few others concerning nonselective operations can be found in Ref. [37] .) The representation of a nonselective operation given by Eqs. (6) and (7) can be quite convenient because it gives a means of describing the evolution of Alice's system purely in terms of operators on her own Hilbert space H A .
Measurements
The most general notion of measurement allowed within quantum mechanics is the POVM (short for Positive Operator-Valued Measure) [29, 34] . These measurements can always be interpreted in terms of the standard von Neumann type if one is again willing to make use of an auxiliary system or ancilla. The idea is simple and much like that considered in the last subsection. Rather than making a von Neumann measurement on H E directly, there is nothing to stop Eve from first interacting her probe with some ancilla and then performing a standard measurement on the newly introduced ancilla. For instance, in this way, Eve can perform a valid quantum mechanical measurement on her probe with a cardinality for the outcome set in excess of the dimensionality of H E . Such a type of measurement is sometimes necessary for gaining the maximum information about a quantum state [24, 12] .
The nice thing about the formalism of POVMs is that this whole process can be described formally without ever making any mention of the extra ancilla. This can be seen as follows. Letσ c on H C be the initial state of the new ancilla. After interacting the probe and the ancilla via some unitary interactionV , say, the state of the combined system will beV (ρ E s ⊗σ c )V † . If a von Neumann measurement is performed on the ancilla alone, there is some set of orthogonal projectorsΠ b on the ancilla's Hilbert space such that
is the probability of the various outcomes of that measurement. HereÎ E is the identity operator on H E .
Using the cyclic property of the trace function and splitting the single trace into a piece over the probe and a piece over the ancilla, this becomes
LettingÊ
we obtain finally that
As promised, all the operators in this expression refer to the probe's Hilbert space H E . Note that the operatorsÊ b are all nonnegative definite, i.e.,
for all |ψ , and satisfy the completeness relation
Any set of operators {Ê b } satisfying these two properties is called a POVM. (This is because these two properties are the natural generalization to the operator realm of the properties of a probability measure.) The POVM formulation of a measurement is particularly convenient for optimization problems because not only can POVMs be derived from specific measurement models but, conversely, any set of operators {Ê b } satisfying the definition of a POVM can be identified with a measurement procedure as described above [23] . This gives an easy algebraic characterization of all possible measurements.
Information and Distinguishability
There are several ways by which to quantify the "information" that Eve gathers about the identity of Alice's preparation. To say it another way, there are several measures with which to gauge Eve's performance in learning the identity ofρ s . The best measure to use in a tradeoff relation is determined by Eve's particular needs. Will Eve be encountering one copy of Alice's system or many? If many, then will the systems be prepared the same each and every time, or rather will they be prepared randomly in one of the two possibilities at each shot? If the latter still, must Eve make an attempt to guess the identity of each state before she receives the next, or rather may she wait until very large blocks of data have been acquired? All these things and many more must be considered before choosing the exact measures for the relation. For specificity, we shall consider three information and distinguishability measures [18] . All these measures, in one sense or another, describe how much "information" can be gained about the identity of a quantum state. However, only one of the measures is truly information theoretic in the sense of Shannon's information theory [38] . What is common to all three is that they each have the power to reveal the physics behind the idea that information gain and state disturbance go hand in hand for quantum physics.
Suppose Eve measures a POVM {Ê b } on H E . If Alice preparedρ 0 , the outcomes of Eve's measurement will occur with probabilities p 0 (b) = tr(ρ E 0Êb ); if Alice preparedρ 1 , the outcomes will occur with probabilities p 1 (b) = tr(ρ E 1Ê b ). Given this measurement on Eve's part, the extent to which Alice's preparations can be distinguished is exactly the extent to which the probability distributions p 0 (b) and p 1 (b) can be distinguished.
A very simple measure of the distinguishability of p 0 (b) and p 1 (b) is the statistical overlap between these distributions [43] :
When there is no overlap between the distributions they can certainly be distinguished completely. Alternatively, the overlap is unity if and only if the distributions are identical and cannot be distinguished at all. Such a measure of distinguishability is nice because of its relative simplicity in expression. However, this measure is not completely satisfactory in that it has no direct statisticalinferential or information-theoretic meaning.
Another measure of how distinct p 0 (b) and p 1 (b) are is the actual Shannon information obtainable about the identity of the distribution. For complete generality, let us suppose for the moment that Eve is expecting the two different quantum statesρ 0 andρ 1 with possibly distinct prior probabilities π 0 and π 1 .
4 Then the amount of Shannon (mutual) information Eve stands to gain from the measurement {Ê b } is
where
is the Shannon entropy of a probability distribution q(b), and, in particular
4 Up until this point, we have assumed that Eve has no prior expectation for a bias concerning which state of the two would be prepared. That is to say, we have been working under the assumption that π 0 = π 1 = 1/2. This remains assumed even now, despite the further generality of our formulation; the introduction of an asymmetry is solely for the purpose of comparison to other forms in the literature.
is the overall prior probability for an outcome b. This measure is particularly appropriate for gauging Eve's measurement performance if her purpose is to identify or make an inference about a long string of quantum states prepared according to the distribution {π 0 , π 1 }.
Finally, we consider the situation in which Eve bases her performance on the success of a guess about the identity of one single instance of Alice's prepared state. Suppose Eve obtains outcome b in her measurement. She can use this knowledge to update her probabilities or expectations about which state Alice really prepared. This is done formally via a use of Bayes' rule [8] . Namely, after the measurement, her posterior expectation for the value of s is given by
Clearly the best strategy for Eve is to guess the value of s such that p(s|b) is largest. Her probability of making an error will then be the minimum of p(0|b) and p(1|b). Averaging this over all possible outcomes gives the expected probability of error upon making the measurement {Ê b }:
The three measures, Eqs. (14), (15) , and (19) , each have the heuristic properties required of one ingredient in a tradeoff principle: as we vary across measurements, the smaller the overlap, the larger the Shannon mutual information, or the smaller the error probability of a guess, then, heuristically, the larger the "information" Eve has available about Alice's preparation. This is not to say, however, that the measurement optimal for any one of these distinguishability measures will be the same as that for any other; this will generally not be the case [18] .
For instance, whenρ 0 andρ 1 are both invertible, the measurement optimal for minimizing the statistical overlap [17] , Eq. (14) , is the von Neumann measurement corresponding to the rather complicated Hermitian operator
The measurement optimal for maximizing the mutual information, Eq. (15), generally has no analytic expression, as can already be seen at the level of density operators on two dimensional Hilbert spaces [16, 18] . On top of that, more generally, the number of outcomes in an optimal measurement is not even known; the strongest result yet proven only bounds that number to be less than the square of the Hilbert space dimension [12] .
In contrast, the measurement for optimizing the probability of error [23] , Eq. (19) , is again a von Neumann 5 The square root of a nonnegative definite operator signifies an operator diagonal in the same basis as the said operator but whose eigenvalues are the positive square roots of the previous. measurement. In fact, this time the optimal measurement corresponds to a fairly simple Hermitian operator:
Generally there are no values of π 0 and π 1 such that all three "optimal" measurements coincide.
To reflect the fact that we are interested only in Eve's ultimate performance as an ingredient for an informationdisturbance principle, we focus hereafter on the optimized versions of the three distinguishability measures. This forces all measurement dependence on Eve's part out of the picture.
The minimal statistical overlap after varying over all measurements turns out to be [17, 18] :
where | · | signifies an operator diagonal in the same basis as its argument, but with eigenvalues that are the absolute values of those of the argument. (Because this particular distinguishability measure is so important for the considerations here, we give a new derivation of Eq. (28) in the Appendix.)
Of the three measures of Eve's performance discussed here, perhaps the accessible information is the most relevant for eavesdropping in quantum key distribution. However, even this has its shortfalls. Presently it is not known whether there is any single numeric summary of Eve's posterior probabilities for the identity ofρ s -such as the mutual information-that can be used for privacy amplification [7] against all possible eavesdropping strategies [31] .
Disturbance Measures
In order to gauge the amount of disturbance Eve inflicts upon Alice's system as she gains information about it, we must find a way compare the state of Alice's system before it enters the black box to the state of the system after it exits. That is to say, we must find a way to compare bothρ 0 toρ A 0 andρ 1 toρ A 1 . Of course, no single simple numerical measure or "distance" will be adequate to all tasks: the quantum states are operators on H A . In matrix representation, each state will have up to N 2 − 1 real parameters (corresponding to the real and imaginary parts of its entries). Just naively, one would expect that it should take at least that many numbers to capture all aspects of Eve's disturbance.
Nevertheless, one can still go a long way toward quantifying disturbance with simple numerical measures. In particular, to get started, one need only notice that there are at least as many disturbance measures as there are distinguishability measures. Each of these can be used as a notion of "distance" between the initial and final states. Moreover, these are especially nice in that they have direct experimental significance, each being intrinsically tied to some statistical or information theoretic test.
As a simple example of how a distinguishability measure can be used to make a disturbance measure, consider the following quantity:
This is just one minus the average fidelity between input and output. Notice that D(Û ) has a functional dependence on the initial statesρ 0 andρ 1 , the dimensionality of Eve's probe's Hilbert space H E , the probe's initial statê σ, and the particular unitary interactionÛ that Eve uses for her eavesdropping. For brevity and convenience, we have made only the functional dependence onÛ explicit in the labeling of this disturbance measure. Equation (29) fulfills-at the very least-the minimal requirement of an intuitive disturbance measure: it has the virtue that it vanishes if and only ifρ A 0 =ρ 0 and ρ A 1 =ρ 1 . In addition to that, however, it equals unity if and only if the outputs are orthogonal to the inputs-that is, that Eve's eavesdropping has probability one of being caught. Finally, because it can be interpreted as related to the statistical overlap of two probability distributions, we can be sure that it is monotonic with our intuition at all points between.
Eq. (29) is perfectly reasonable as far our purposes are concerned. Nevertheless, one should not lose sight of the fact that D(Û ) is quite arbitrary as a disturbance measure. This remains true even if one insists that a disturbance measure be built from the fidelity function alone and not any other distinguishability measure. For instance, one can still ask, "Why take an average of the two fidelities? Why not a geometrical mean? Why not relate the disturbance to the minimum of the two fidelities?" The questions can go on and on. The only means for relieving the arbitrariness in choosing a disturbance measure is to have a specific physical/experimental application in mind. This is just as it was for the discussion of Eve's possible information-gain measures.
Let us give one more example along these lines to help firm the idea that the number of variations on the theme is quite large. Suppose Alice expects the eavesdropper to be active at random and only 50% of the time. Whenever active, Eve will use the same strategy Eq. (6), which Alice knows in advance. A natural notion of disturbance for this particular scenario is the (best possible) probability that Alice can catch Eve out when she is active. When the probability of catching Eve is large, then the disturbance can be assumed large; when the probability of catching Eve is no better than chance, then the disturbance is small. Thus, referring to Eq. (28), the disturbance of input state s is quantified by
On average then, the disturbance viewed in this way is
The same sort of game, of course, can also be played with the maximal amount of information that Alice can gain about Eve's activity, giving rise to still another disturbance measure. Finally we note that, above and beyond these examples, there are still other ways of using the distinguishability measures of the last subsection for the purpose of gauging Eve's disturbance. For instance, they may be used not only to compare the input and output states of Alice's system but also for checking the extent to which Eve has broken the coherence of that system with yet other systems. This is an idea due to Schumacher [37] . It is especially relevant to the model considered in this paper because Alice recovers her quantum system after Eve has interacted with it; Alice's system is not passed on to a third person, such as Bob, as is the case in quantum key distribution scenarios. Therefore Alice is in the position to check whether coherences have indeed been broken. By the same token, this measure may be less relevant to quantum cryptography.
Let us spell out Schumacher's idea in some detail. Suppose Alice prepares her two statesρ 0 andρ 1 by preparing a composite system in the pure states |ψ AB 0 and |ψ AB 1 on the tensor product Hilbert space H A ⊗H B . The intention is to give to Eve only that part of the system described on the Hilbert space H A . Therefore, for s = 0, 1, the pure states must satisfŷ
If the upshot of Eve's interaction with H A is given by Eq. (6), then the overall state of the composite system after the single component emerges from the black box will bê ofρ s , one might think we are introducing much more freedom in the formulation of the problem than there was previously. There are an infinite number of purifications of the given density operators with all manner of relations between themselves. One would think that surely, whatever disturbance measure we build with these purifications, it will inherit that extraneous freedom.
Surprisingly, that turns out not to be the case-at least for some measures of distinguishability. To take as an example, one can speak of the fidelity between input and output in this scenario, a quantity Schumacher calls the entanglement fidelity:
This quantity turns out to be completely independent of the particular purification chosen forρ s [37] . Hence it can be expressed purely in terms ofρ s and the particular operation Eve subjectedρ s . In Ref. [37] , it is shown that
As might be expected, the entanglement fidelity can be a more exacting measure of change between input and output. For instance, it can be proven that [27, 3] 
Thus, if Eq. (29) is considered an adequate disturbance measure for a particular application of our model, then so too should the more stringent measure
This is just a small sampling of the numerous things that can be imagined for gauging disturbance in a quantifiable way. Nevertheless, the options are already great enough to start thinking seriously of several ways of viewing an information-disturbance tradeoff principle.
Tradeoff
Finally, we are in a position of taking our two building blocks, information measures and disturbance measures, and combining them to arrive at a formal tradeoff principle. The first thing to recall is that once the two quantum statesρ 0 andρ 1 are fixed, the only free variables in any of the measures are the dimensionality of H E , the probe's initial stateσ, and the unitary interactionÛ. To expedite our discussion, let us consider a generic information measure I(Û) and a generic disturbance measure D(Û ). The discussion to follow remains true for any two such measures. It should be noted that only theÛ -dependence of I and D has been made explicit. (The reason for this will be made clear below.)
There are at least two straightforward ways to combine I(Û) and D(Û ) into various "tradeoff relations." The simplest idea is rather analogous to the construction of the Heisenberg uncertainty relations in that it is based on the idea that there must be some standard "figure of merit" for comparing information and disturbance. In the Heisenberg relations, the figure of merit for the "tradeoff" of ∆x and ∆p is a multiplicative one:
In our case, we may well imagine a standard or convenient function F : IR × IR → IR with which to compare the two quantities of our concern. If it is an interesting function, then it will be bounded in at least one direction-say, from below-and we will be at liberty to define
where the minimum is taken over all the free variables of I and D. Notice that what remains is a function purely of the two input statesρ 0 andρ 1 . Eq. (39) defines an information-disturbance tradeoff relation for an arbitrary probe, probe initial state, and interaction on Eve's part by
The right hand side of Eq. (40) plays the role of theh/2 in the Heisenberg relations. As already noted, the lower bound in this new principle depends on the two quantum states under consideration. This is completely reasonable: one expects a necessary information-disturbance tradeoff only when the two states being compared cannot be interpreted as "classical" states. For instance, whenρ 0 and ρ 1 are pure and orthogonal, all the information about the state's identity can be recovered without incurring any disturbance whatsoever.
The second way to think about a tradeoff relation is to ask, "For a fixed disturbance, what is the maximal information that Eve can recover about the state's identity?" This defines a constrained-variation problem: for fixed
where d is some constant, what is
The optimization here again is taken over all the free variables of I, namely over all probes, over all initial states for each probe, and over all unitary interactions. As opposed to the last method, which characterizes the nonclassicality ofρ 0 andρ 1 by a single number, this method characterizes the same via a complete curve, say,
Equations (40) and (43) encapsulate the essence of what this paper is about. 7 Using any of the measures of the 7 Our emphasis of these options for expressing the informationdisturbance principle should not be taken to preclude the possibility that weaker bounds along the same lines might also be useful. For instance, an unachievable bound in Eq. (40) may also be of interest for various purposes. For an application along these lines related to quantum cryptography, see Ref. [30] .
preceding subsections, or using any measures left yet unconsidered, these equations define quite rigorously what is meant by the phrase "information gain and quantum state disturbance go hand in hand in quantum theory."
In Section 4, we shall carry out the informationdisturbance principle program in some detail for two pure quantum states. This gives something of a flavor for how the program goes in the general case, but it also hints at the calculational difficulties that crop up even in the simplest of cases. Before pursuing this, however, we explore in the next section the significance of this principle within the historical context.
Historical Context
In this Section, we shall briefly explore the connection between the ideas developed here and some common prejudices concerning measurements and disturbance.
It is often said that the Heisenberg uncertainty relations are the ultimate reason that Eve's measurements disturb Alice's system in quantum key distribution. 8 To the extent that this statement can be given a precise meaning, it is rather beside the point in this context. The Heisenberg relations concern our conceptual and experimental inability to simultaneously "get hold" of two classical observables, such as a particle's position x and momentum p. Thus they concern our inability to ascribe classical states of motion to quantum mechanical systems. This remains true of any of the standard meanings for the phrase "uncertainty relation"-that is, whether one is speaking of a semiclassical argument like Heisenberg's original one [21] , the well-known textbook version of the relation due to Robertson [35] , or instead rigorous bounds on the simultaneous measurability of conjugate variables [1] .
Moreover, the Robertson version of the relation has nothing to say about the idea that observing one classical variable causes a "disturbance" to the other. In particular, upon following its derivation carefully, one finds nothing remotely resembling the picture of the Heisenberg argument [34] . What is found instead is that, when many copies of a system are prepared in the same quantum state ψ(x), if one makes enough position measurements on the copies to get an estimate of ∆x, and similarly makes enough momentum measurements on different(!) copies to get an estimate of ∆p, then one can be assured that the product of those numbers will be no smaller than h/2. No reciprocal "disturbance" of any kind is involved here, sincex andp are measured on different systems.
The source of the misunderstanding is perhaps typified by statements such as the following from Wolfgang Pauli, 8 One notable exception is Ref. [15] , which asserts, ". . . quantum cryptography . . . relies on the impossibility of ascribing definite values to noncommuting variables in order to assure secrecy of communication." collecting a set of thoughts now ingrained in the folklore of the theory [32, p. 132]:
The indivisibility of elementary quantum processes (finiteness of the quantum of action) finds expression in an indeterminacy of the interaction between instrument of observation (subject) and the system observed (object), which cannot be got rid of by determinable corrections. It is therefore only the experimental arrangement that defines the physical state of the system, whose characterization thus essentially involves some knowledge about the system. For every act of observation is an interference, of undeterminable extent, with the instruments of observation as well as with the system observed, and interrupts the causal connection between the phenomena preceding and succeeding it. The gain of knowledge by means of an observation has as a necessary and natural consequence the loss of some other knowledge. The observer has however the free choice, corresponding to two mutually exclusive experimental arrangements, of determining what particular knowledge is gained and what other knowledge is lost (complementary pairs of opposites). Therefore every irrevocable interference by an observation with the sources of information about a system alters its state, and creates a new phenomenon in Bohr's sense.
These sorts of ideas, folklore or not, have very little to do with the limits of what can happen to quantum states when information is gathered about their identity. The theme of the approach suggested by quantum cryptography differs from that used in formulating the Heisenberg relations in that it makes no reference to conjugate or complementary variables. The only elements entering the considerations are related to the quantum states themselves. Because of this, one is forced to contemplate a notion of state disturbance that is purely quantum mechanical in character, making no reference to the semiclassical considerations that drove early conceptual work on the theory.
Indeed, the main contribution of quantum cryptography to fundamental physical understanding has been the lesson that that we must focus on multiple (nonorthogonal) quantum states for the construction of an information-disturbance principle.
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Once the focus is shifted from conceptually gauging disturbance in terms of classical variables to gauging it in terms of the the quantum states themselves, there is no necessary disturbance whatsoever connected to the process of measurement-if one is talking about a single quantum state [29] . For in- 9 The first appearance of this idea seems to be in the work of Stephen Wiesner circa 1970. It was written up in a manuscript titled "Conjugate Coding" submitted to IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, but remained unpublished until much later [41] .
stance, suppose Eve encounters only a single pure state |ψ in our scenario-rather than one of a set of two nonorthogonal states-and she makes a measurement directly on Alice's system corresponding to a set of orthogonal projectorsΠ b = |b b|. Then there is no physical principle that can prevent her from using a measurement interaction that returns Alice's quantum system back to the state |ψ at its completion. This is a simple consequence of the fact that Eve knows the identity of the incoming state. Her general inability to predict her measurement outcome cannot erase this-it does not matter how random the outcome of the measurement turns out to be. Nor does it matter that a second measurement of the same observable may reveal a completely different outcome than the first.
The idea of a necessary disturbance to quantum states upon measurement only becomes effective when that measurement's "random" outcome reveals some statistical information about the identity of the unknown quantum state. Also crucial here is that the set of possible states, even though known to Eve, have at least some elements nonorthogonal to the others. This makes a classical representation of the states in terms of mutually existent objective properties impossible. This is the legacy of quantum cryptography.
What does it mean to say that the states are disturbed in and of themselves without reference to classical variables? It means quite literally that Alice faces a loss of predictability about the outcomes of further measurements on her system whenever an information gathering eavesdropper has intervened. Take as an example the case whereρ 0 andρ 1 are nonorthogonal pure states. Then, for each of these, there exists one nontrivial observable for which Alice can predict the outcome with complete certainty-namely the projectors parallel toρ 0 andρ 1 . That is to say, she can ask the system, "Are you in the state I prepared you in," and it will answer yes with certainty. However, after her system passes into the black box occupied by Eve and returns, she will no longer be able to predict completely the outcomes of both these measurements. This is the real content of these ideas: the disturbance is to Alice's description of her system and what she can predict of it.
Pure States
We shall devote ourselves in this Section to working out, for two nonorthogonal pure states, one of the many tradeoff principles discussed in Section 2. The particular one considered is motivated by its overall simplicity, not by its operational significance for quantum cryptography. The overriding concern is that-in this way-we will be able to carry out the majority of the steps analytically. Consequently, in this exercise, we will be less reliant on various numerically motivated conjectures than was the case for previous endeavors [19] . It is hoped that this procedure will lead to insight into the general structure of more practically-motivated tradeoff principles, such as that considered in Ref. [19] . 10 Let us jump into the example. The two quantum states that Alice prepares areρ 0 = |0 0| andρ 1 = |1 1| where |0 = cosα |a 0 + sin α |a 1 (44)
are vectors on a two-dimensional Hilbert space H A . Here |a 0 and |a 1 form an orthonormal basis on H A . Algebraically, the distinction between these states is parameterized by the single number
As already discussed in great detail, Eve-in an attempt to gather information about the identity of the state Alice prepared-will interact Alice's system with a probe described by the states on a Hilbert space H E . This will lead to Alice being left finally in possession of a system described by a density operatorρ A s . Similarly Eve will be left with her probe being described by some density operatorρ E s . In each case, the value of s depends on Alice's particular preparation.
The tradeoff principle we shall consider in this Section is based on the information-gain and disturbance measures of Eqs. (28) and (29), which here reduce to
and
respectively. That is to say, the "information" measure is taken to be the best possible probability of error that Eve can encounter when trying to guess the identity of Alice's preparation; the disturbance measure is taken to be the average probability that Alice will detect a discrepancy if she performs a test corresponding to the actual state she sent into the black box. The particular way we shall combine the two ingredients, Eqs. (47) and (48), is in finding a curve as in Eq. (43) . That is to say, for fixed
10 The tradeoff principle there is based on the same disturbance measure as considered here. However the information measure is the actual Shannon information accessible to Eve. Under certain circumstances and certain assumptions, these two quantities are sufficient for defining a privacy amplification procedure for quantum key distribution [9] in the context of the BB84 protocal [4] .
where the minimization is performed subject to the constraint, we seek to find the curve
The constant d 0 denotes the minimal disturbance that need be incurred in the process of finding the maximal allowed information. Thus we are assuming that the disturbance is never so large as to be an unnecessary disturbance.
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This plan requires that we be able to perform the constrained variation necessary for it. We tackle this problem in several steps. The first is in finding the simplest general description of the probe and its unitary interaction with Alice's system. The second is in calculating all the relevant quantities of the tradeoff relation for a fixed interaction on Eve's part. The third is making a two-state probe plausible by analyzing a set of variational equations. Finally the curve is optimized based on the assumption of a two state probe.
The Probe and Interaction
We set the wheels turning by noticing that there is no utility in Eve allowing her probe to start off in a mixed state. This is because any mixed state for Eve's probe can always be thought of as arising from a partial trace over the degrees of freedom of a larger probe prepared in a pure state [27] . Since the dimensionality of the probe's Hilbert space H E is a free variable anyway, this choice will cause no loss in generality.
But then, however, there is no use in declaring the initial state of the probe in our variations: any pure state can be transformed unitarily into any other pure state. This forms the reason why we have madeÛ the only explicit argument of the various information and disturbance measures: it encodes both the probe's dimensionality and the particular interaction it undertakes.
Let us now focus on saying something about the dimensionality of H E . The interactionÛ takes its formal description as a unitary operator on H A ⊗ H E . Supposing, as just discussed, the probe starts off in some standard pure state |ψ , we can describe the outcome of this interaction as follows: 11 This assumption is not necessary; it is made only for the purpose of relaxing the need to make repetitive conditional statements later.
to note, however, is that the number of nonzero λ s n is determined by the dimensionality of H A .
Writing the post-interaction states in Schmidt polar form is particularly convenient because then one easily sees that the state of the system finally left in Eve's possession is of the form
Similarly the states passed back to Alice are of the form
Eq. (53) tells us, rather interestingly, that we never need consider probes for Eve with Hilbert space dimension greater than four [19] . This follows because, at most, all four of the |E s n can be linearly independent vectors. This means that the relevant states accessible to Eve can never act on more than the span of these four vectors. The statesρ E 0 andρ E 1 are thus always confined to actions on (effectively) four-dimensional Hilbert spaces at the outset.
It was found numerically-but not proven-for the tradeoff relation considered in Ref. [19] that, in the end, a two-state probe always sufficed for defining the optimal tradeoff curve. In certain ways, this was rather surprising: Eve's probe never need take advantage of all the Hilbert space allotted it. Therefore it would be very nice to demonstrate the same effect rigorously for the present tradeoff relation. Unfortunately, this goal has yet to be found attainable: the algebra becomes quite unwieldy. The best that has been demonstrated (assuming the various mild assumptions to be made below) is that a twostate probe makes the tradeoff stationary. However, this does not demonstrate that a two-state probe is globally optimal; it only demonstrates that a two-state probe is locally the best, the worst, or an inflection point. There are indeed other local optima, though-based on numerical simulations-none appear to be the global optimum.
In what follows, we shall sidestep the issue of trying to show that, starting with a four-dimensional probe, a twodimensional one suffices to make the variation stationary. There appears to be nothing to be gained from this exercise other than mathematical heartache. Instead, here, we shall start off within the restricted scenario of allowing H E to be up to three dimensional. This allows for a much easier path to the essential physics that a two-state probe suffices for the construction of the optimal (stationary, to be more precise) P e -D tradeoff curve. It also cleans up the mathematics in this paper considerably and helps make the exposition tractable. It must be emphasized, however, that by making this restriction, we cut off the possibility of proving that the curve we shall ultimately obtain is actually optimal-though, based on numerical work, we certainly believe it is. Full rigor or a better methodology for tackling this problem must remain the subject of future work.
All that said, let us take H E to be a three-dimensional Hilbert space and let us equip it with an orthonormal basis |e β , β = x, y, z. (Ultimately we will choose this basis to be as convenient as possible.) This gives a natural basis for the Hilbert space H A ⊗H E , namely the tensor product basis |a m |e β , m = 0, 1 and β = x, y, z. The set of all possible unitary operators on this six dimensional Hilbert space is quite large: without some further symmetry arguments for reducing its size, our variational problem will remain quite intractable. To this end, let us start building some notation.
Let us write the action of each unitary operatorÛ in our variational in the following way:
Since Eve's probe starts off in the standard state |ψ , we need not be concerned with the action ofÛ on the remainder of the Hilbert space. Note that unitarity requires that
At least one thing should be clear at this point. If Alice were to relabel her orthonormal basis |a m by interchanging 0 and 1, this would only lead to a relabeling of her two input states. The algebraic relation between the input states, Eq. (46), remains invariant. Thus one should expect that Eve will never need to break that symmetry in her apparatus to ferret out the best tradeoff. Therefore, we may fairly safely assume that under the interchange 0 ↔ 1, the probe's states (relative to the basis states of Alice's system) keep the same algebraic relations among themselves. That is to say, we may assume that the operatorÛ is always such that all inner products R m n |R mn remain invariant under an interchange of 0 ↔ 1 in the indices.
This already places severe restrictions on the set of unitary operators that we need consider for the variation. However, we can still go a few steps further in restriction. For this let us write the input states in Eqs. (44) and (45) as
Then, we can rewrite Eq. (52) as
In this notation, the final states accessible to Eve for information gathering measurements arê
Equation (61) is of particular interest because it tells us that we can freely adjust the phase of all the vectors |R s n with no effect whatsoever on the states received by Eve. This translates into the freedom to set the phase of the |R mn as we wish, as long as we do it to |R 00 and |R 10 in unison and as long as we do it to |R 01 and |R 11 To see where this is going, let us write the four equations implicit in Eq. (56) as:
|R 10 = X 7 |e x + X 8 |e y + X 9 |e z (64)
In terms of these new variables, the unitarity relation Eq. (57) becomes,
What we would like to do is use the freedom in the arbitrary basis |e β , the symmetry requirements, and the extra phase freedom just mentioned to make the X k , k = 1, . . . , 12 as simple looking as possible. To do this, we first choose the phase of |R 11 so that X 12 is real. Next, we recognize the fact that |R 01 and |R 10 must be of the same length. This follows because we require
Therefore, we may choose the basis states |e β so that:
, X 4 and X 5 are both real, and X 6 = X 9 = 0. Finally we use the phase freedom in |R 00 and |e z to make both X 2 and X 3 real. In particular, we take the opportunity to make X 3 and X 12 of the same sign. In these equations and hereafter we treat all the X k as real, making all phases explicit in the factors e iθk . Can we go the remainder of the way and justify setting e iθ1 , e iθ10 , and e iθ11 all to be real numbers? Actually, the answer is yes, though it should have been quite plausible in the first place: since the input states, Eqs. (44) and (45), involve only real coefficients, there is no reason to expect complex numbers to be necessary for describing Eve's probe. Let us prove this now.
The symmetry requirements
respectively, give
and that the quantity
is real. On the other hand, Eq. (67) requires
Equations (75) and (77) taken together imply that we must have
Thus e iθ1 = ±1. By the same token, we must also have e i(θ11−θ10) = ±1. Finally, these two facts along with the reality of the quantity in Eq. (76) gives that both e iθ11 and e iθ10 are real. That is to say, we have just proven that by suitable choice of basis and phase, all the X k may be assumed real without loss of generality.
The four |R mn can be visualized easily as vectors in a three-dimensional real vector space. In fact, by making a sketch, one immediately sees that the symmetry requirements taken together uniquely fix the components of the vectors up to a freedom of relative sign between X 3 and X 12 . However, this particular freedom was already taken away by fiat above. Therefore, we set X 3 = X 12 . Absorbing all the remaining phase freedom back into the variables, we have in the final accounting:
|R 01 = X 4 |e x + X 5 |e y (80)
The unitarity relations, Eqs. (66) and (67), after all these simplifying assumptions, become
This means that in our variational problem, we need only search over three free parameters: this is a substantial savings over approaching the problem blindly! We may parameterize the remaining X k in the following way:
How is a two-state probe-as opposed to a three-state probe-expressed in these terms? Notice that if, for whatever reason, sin λ = 0, then the four |R mn will all be confined to the same two-dimensional subspace of H E . Thus, if at the end of the calculation we find that λ must be an integer multiple of π, we will have demonstrated that Eve's probe could have been taken to be a two state system in the first place.
After the Interaction
Let us now fix a particular unitary operatorÛ given by Eq. (85) and work out all the operators and quantities relevant to both Alice and Eve.
We start by finding the density operatorsρ E s , s = 0, 1, accessible to Eve.
12 Given all the formalism developed, it is really just a question of turning the algebraic crank. After a lot of careful algebra, one finds:
(ρ E 0 ) xz = 1 2 sin 2λ sin 2 α sin φ cos θ + cos 2 α cos φ cos θ + cos α sin α (cos φ − sin φ) sin θ (88) 12 We list all the components rather than cut to the chase of the final expression for Pe(Û) to save some work on the part of anyone else that may wish to construct other information-disturbance tradeoffs.
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Hermiticity determines the remainder of the matrix elements forρ E 0 . The matrix elements forρ E 1 are given by exactly the same expressions except that cos α and sin α are interchanged everywhere.
With all the matrix elements ofρ E 0 andρ E 1 in hand, it is a straightforward-though tedious-matter to calculate the eigenvalues of the operator
and to arrive finally at an expression for Eve's bestpossible probability of error. Using Eq. (47), this is
(94) Given the particular strategy of enacting the interaction U , Eqs. (93) and (94) completely characterize the ultimate "information" available to Eve about Alice's preparation (as far as is the concern here).
Let us now turn our attention to describing Alice's situation after her quantum system reëmerges from Eve's black box. To this end we may write the overall postinteraction state as
Again turning the algebraic crank, one finds:
(ρ A 0 ) 01 = cosα sin α sin 2 λ + cos 2 λ sin 2φ cos 2θ
As before, Hermiticity determines the final matrix element ofρ A 0 , and the matrix elements ofρ A 1 are given by the expressions above except that cos α and sin α are interchanged everywhere.
Making use of Eq. (48), we finally have an expression for the disturbance forced upon Alice's states:
where S is the parameter defined by Eq. (46). We are now in a position to make the final step toward generating the curve of Eq. (51).
The Tradeoff Curve
We can see from Eq. (93) that the problem of finding the smallest P e (Û ) as a function of the constraint Eq. (49) boils down to finding the largest G(Û ) as function of the same constraint. Let us turn our attention along these lines.
In order for G(Û ) to be maximal, it must be at least stationary with respect to small variations δλ, δφ, and δθ in λ, φ, and θ, respectively. Thus we must have
where G λ denotes the partial derivative of G(Û ) with respect to λ, etc. However, not all of these variations can be made independently; we must satisfy the constraint that D(Û ) remain constant. Therefore, we must have also:
Evaluating all the partial derivatives
, at cos λ = 0, we can see that Eqs. (102) and (103) are both automatically satisfied. This is no surprise, for if cos λ = 0, then D = 0 and P e = 1/2: when there is no disturbance whatsoever, there can be no information gain-this is the result established in Ref. [5] . Now suppose cos λ = 0 and sin 2φ = ±1, so that, regardless of the value of θ, Eve will be able to gain some information from her interaction. Under these conditions, a little algebra shows that G φ = 0. Thus we may transform our problem into one of unconstrained variation by taking
Eliminating this variable from Eq. (103), we have that all remaining stationary points must satisfy
It is easily verified that both of these equations can always be satisfied by taking sin λ = 0. In particular, when sin λ = 0, Eq. (105) is satisfied automatically. Equation (106) can be satisfied by further adjusting φ and θ. The significance of this result is that a two-state probe for Eve is sufficient to make the information-disturbance tradeoff stationary. As already stated, it would be nice to go further and show that this set of stationary points also leads to a global maximum for G(Û ), but that is a much more difficult problem. In particular, it is clear that there are still other solutions for Eqs. (105) and (106) with neither cos λ = 0 nor sin λ = 0.
Henceforth, we shall rely on this weak result and numerical work to take it for granted that an optimal interactionÛ will have sin λ = 0. With this assumption, the remainder of the problem of finding Eq. (51) greatly simplifies. In particular, the Eq. (94) reduces to
To simplify things even further, let us temporarily think of our problem as one of minimizing D(Û ) subject to the constraint that G(Û ) be fixed. This problem is equivalent to the one we set out to solve, and is of use here because we will be able to invert the results of this to get the desired form. With this, we have, for fixed φ, that D(Û ) is minimized when [19] tan 2θ = S cos 2φ
and this results in a minimal value of D(Û ) given by
(109) Notice again that, as G → 0, D → 0 as it should. Alternatively, the larger the value of G, the more information that is gained about Alice's system. When G = 1, so that Eve's probability of error is as small as it can be, the smallest associated disturbance that can be given the states is
Equation (109) can be inverted to give the solution we need. Using Eq. (49) and a little algebra, we obtain:
Taking d 0 as a standard disturbance, we can finally write the equation of the long sought after curve:
and d is restricted to the range [0, d 0 ]. This completes the exercise of finding the particular information-disturbance principle given by Eqs. (49)- (51) for two pure states. There are at least two (disappointing) things to notice about Eqs. (113) and (114). The first is the energy that had to be expended in order to work out a tradeoff relation for one of-surely-the simplest possible cases. Given the hoped-for foundational importance of the principle, this is rather curious. In contrast, the general Heisenberg uncertainty relation (in the form given by Robertson [35] ) comes about via a simple application of the Schwarz inequality.
The second thing to note about Eqs. (113) and (114) is the relative complexity of the curve. Why is it not linear? Or, barring that, why are information and disturbance not simple reciprocals of one another or some other such simple relation? Despite the seeming (observation based) simplicity of the information and disturbance measures chosen for this exercise, it may just be the case that there are still better measures to be explored. Perhaps the proper measures to use are the ones that will give rise to a simple compact expression for the tradeoff principle.
Mixed States
The deepest understanding of what the information-disturbance principle has to say about quantum theory as a whole will necessarily come from the mixed-state analog of these considerations. For only then can a direct comparison be made to classical probability distributions-the object of study in Shannon information theory. The results of such a comparison are essential for distilling the cut between classical and quantum theories [11] .
Unfortunately, in moving to the mixed state version of the information-disturbance principle, the mathematical difficulties become even more acute than was the case for pure states. This suggests strongly that new techniques or a better formulation of the problem are called for. Nevertheless there is one restricted result about information gain versus disturbance for mixed states that brings out an interesting mystery. This result is known as the "nobroadcasting theorem" [3, 18] .
Suppose again that a quantum system, secretly prepared by Alice in one state from the set A = {ρ 0 ,ρ 1 }, is dropped into Eve's black box. The only difference between the present scenario and our previous considerations is that now we shall suppose the black box built solely for the purpose of broadcasting or replicating the quantum state onto two separate quantum systems. That is to say, a state identical to the original should appear in each system when it is considered without regard to the other. We are willing to allow correlation or quantum entanglement between the systems. Can such a black box be built? If so, then that will certainly provide Eve a way to gain information about the mixed state without causing a detectable disturbance in the system: Eve need simply broadcast the state, give Alice one of the systems, and make a information-gathering measurement on the other.
The standard "no-cloning" theorem of Wootters, Zurek, and Dieks [44, 13] prohibits broadcasting when the states in A are pure and nonorthogonal; for the only way to have each of the broadcast systems described separately by a pure state |ψ is for their joint state to be |ψ |ψ ; that is to say, |ψ must be cloned to be broadcast. When the states in A are mixed, however, things are not a priori so clear.
A mixed-state no-cloning theorem is not sufficient to demonstrate no-broadcasting, for there are many conceivable ways to broadcast the mixed statesρ s without the joint state being in the product formρ s ⊗ρ s , the mixedstate analog of cloning. As already stated, the systems are also allowed to be correlated or entangled in such a way as to give the right marginal density operators. For instance, if the density operatorsρ s are diagonal in the same basis and have the spectral decomposition
a set of potential broadcasting states are the highly correlated joint stateŝ
which, though not of the product formρ s ⊗ρ s , reproduces the correct marginal density operators. The general problem, posed formally, is this. A quantum system AE is composed of two parts, A and E, each having an N -dimensional Hilbert space. System A is secretly prepared in one state from a set A = {ρ 0 ,ρ 1 } of two quantum states. System E, slated to receive the unknown state, is in a standard quantum stateΣ. The initial state of the composite system AE is the product stateρ s ⊗Σ, where s = 0 or 1 specifies which state is to be broadcast. The question that is being asked is whether there is any physical process E (as described in Section 2.1), consistent with the laws of quantum theory, that leads to an evolution of the form
whereR s is any state on the N 2 -dimensional Hilbert space AE such that
If there is an E that satisfies this for bothρ 0 andρ 1 , then the set A can be broadcast. A special case of broadcasting is the "cloning" evolution specified by
It turns out that despite Eve's best efforts, a physical evolution can lead to broadcasting if and only ifρ 0 and ρ 1 commute [3] . In this way the concept of broadcasting makes a very nice communication theoretic cut between commuting and noncommuting density operators; this is another way to express the cut between classical and quantum state descriptions.
13 It also turns out that A is clonable if and only if ρ 0 and ρ 1 are identical or orthogonal, i.e., ρ 0 ρ 1 = 0 [3] .
This result seems to indicate that a key component in an information-disturbance principle for mixed states will be the noncommutivity of the states in A, not their nonorthogonality. (For pure states, the properties of orthogonality and commutivity coincide.) The enticing mystery that arises from the no-broadcasting theorem is the following. Study of Eqs. (113) and (114) and their analogs in Ref. [19] reveals that information can be gained about the identity of two pure quantum states without disturbance if and only if they are orthogonal. (Also see Refs. [5, 10] .) It follows that there can be information gain without disturbance if and only if the two pure states can be cloned. That is to say, we have the following logical relationship for pure states in A:
Because of this, the no-broadcasting theorem might lead one to expect an analogous logical relation to hold for mixed states, with broadcasting as the relevant concept. That is, one might expect that information can be gained without disturbance if and only if the two states can be broadcast. This thought, however, is misguided. Life again becomes interestingly more complex when it comes to mixed states.
A simple example to consider is that of two density operatorsρ 0 andρ 1 for which there is a basis in which both are block diagonal with identical blocks. That is to say, for illustration, eachρ s has a structure something like:ρ 
Suppose furthermore that the density operators are noncommuting on each of these blocks. Thusρ 0 andρ 1 themselves are noncommuting, and it follows that the set A cannot be broadcast. However, if-depending upon the value of s-the trace of these blocks differ, so that, say,ρ 0 is more likely to be in the "a" block thanρ 1 , etc., then it follows immediately that there are information gathering measurements that cause no disturbance to these states. The measurement POVM consists of a set of multidimensional projectors onto each of the blocks in theρ s ; this measurement can be performed as a quantum nondemolition measurement and yet reveals information about the identity because of the differing likelihoods of the outcomes.
An interesting open question is the necessary and sufficient mathematical criteria required of two density operators to insure that information gathering measurements necessarily disturb the quantum states. Securing this result is surely the first step toward the formulation of a tradeoff principle for mixed states.
Foundations
To close the paper, we briefly sketch an observation hinting that the information-disturbance tradeoff principle itself has something to say about the foundations of quantum theory.
Let us return to the Hilbert space H A ⊗ H E -the setting for so much of this paper-but, this time, with the conviction to play a new game. Suppose, for whatever reason, we believe all the standard quantum mechanical axioms sound and beyond question, except one. Namely, we hold suspect the structure of the general group of time evolutions to which this vector space may be submitted. Perhaps we are simply skeptics, or have always wanted a physical mechanism for wave function collapse in isolated systems, or have some other religious bent that leads us in this direction; the motivation is not all that important.
To be relatively general at the outset, we might suppose that this group T consists of all maps continuous in time that are bijections of H A ⊗H E onto itself, and that it contains at least all the unitary operations. In particular, we may not wish to tie down the set of evolutions any further than this-it might contain other linear maps, nonlinear maps, maps discontinuous with respect to the topology of the vector space, or what have you.
As it stands, not much can be said about the group T . So let us now ask what would be required of a mapping Φ ∈ T if it were to be capable of breaking the principles espoused in this paper. One thing that pops to mind is the following definition:
A mapping Φ is said to allow illegal eavesdropping (i.e., information gain without disturbance) if there are two nonorthogonal states |s , s = 0, 1, in H A and a standard state |σ in H E such that 14 Φ |s |σ = |s |σ s ,
Note that if such an illegal eavesdropping map were to exist, then-since all the other axioms of quantum mechanics are still intact-an appropriate measurement on Eve's system alone (in principle well after the interaction) would be able to reveal information about the state |s without disturbing it. This follows because the states |σ 0 and |σ 1 are distinct, and by more than just a phase. It would not be wise to base a quantum cryptographic system on the two states |0 and |1 . Suppose now, however, having grown accustomed to the benefits of quantum cryptography, we find the existence of such maps simply too unbearable. We therefore take it as a principle that time evolutions corresponding to illegal eavesdropping cannot exist. The question is, can we still find time evolutions in T that are more general than those provided by the unitary group? This is not a completely trivial question: the exclusion of illegal eavesdropping maps from T looks to be a rather weak condition at first sight. In particular, the formulation of the eavesdropping maps given in the definition above concerns product states only. The set of product states on H A ⊗ H E , however, is an infinitesimally small part of the total space. For instance, because of the generality of T , one can easily imagine maps on H A ⊗ H E that are perfectly well behaved on product states, doing just what we expect-i.e., preserving all inner productseven though their behavior goes completely awry on the set of entangled states. What is to keep these nonunitary maps from being left in T ?
It turns out that the group property of T , the fact that it is assumed to include the unitary group as a subgroup, and Wigner's famous theorem on symmetry operations [42, 2, 34] are enough to do just this. If there is a map in T that allows the increase or decrease of the modulus of any inner product of two states in H A ⊗ H E -it matters not whether they are product states or entangled statesthen we can construct another map that will use that effect for illegal eavesdropping. Thus, if the informationdisturbance tradeoff principle is to be upheld, T can only contain inner-product modulus preserving maps. And this, in fact, is the premise for Wigner's theorem. This theorem states that, allowing the possible redefinition of phase, all inner-product modulus preserving maps must be unitary or anti-unitary. If the maps are to be continuous in time, then they must be unitary. Now, to make this argument complete, let us show how to construct an illegal eavesdropping map from an arbitrary time-continuous nonunitary map Ψ on H A ⊗ H E . Since Ψ is not unitary, its action must decrease the inner product (modulus) of at least two states. 15 Call them |φ 0 and |φ 1 , and let |φ s = Ψ(|φ s ) . 
we have all the tools we need for the job. Namely, the map
that is the composition of all the other maps, is an illegal eavesdropping map. Moreover, this map is in T because of its group property. This simple point demonstrates that there are things to be learned about quantum theory itself by observing how it can be used for communication and computation. The particular result here is not all that satisfactory in that almost all the structure of quantum mechanics was taken for granted at the outset. Moreover, we had to require that T contain at least the unitary maps before we could make any progress. 16 Nevertheless, it does provide food for thought about the directions to which quantum information theory can turn. 15 If it increases any one inner product, then it must decrease another. See Ref. [33] .
16 N. Gisin has pointed out that this particular assumption can be done away with by relying on the strengthened version of Wigner's theorem reported in Ref. [20] .
Appendix: Error Probability
In this Appendix, the optimal probability of error Eq. (28) is derived in a previously unpublished way. Previous derivations [22, 23] have always relied on the fact that a decision problem was of the main concern; therefore the derivations have always taken the liberty of assuming that an optimal POVM for error probability need only have two outcomes.
We start with an alternative way of writing the classical probability of error, Eq. (19) [40] , namely,
is the Kolmogorov variational distance [28] . Therefore, finding the optimal value of P e (p 0 , p 1 ) over all measurements is equivalent to finding the maximal value of the Kolmogorov variational distance. Using the explicit quantum mechanical forms for the probabilities of the outcomes the measurement {Ê b } the Kolmogorov distance becomes 
This follows from the linearity of the trace and the definition of Eq. (21). Now let |γ i denote an orthonormal eigenbasis forΓ and let γ i denote the associated eigenvalues. Taking into account Eq. (12), we have
The last expression in this, however, is equal by definition to tr|Γ|. Thus we have, for all POVMs {Ê b },
To see that this upper bound can be achieved by some POVM, simply take theÊ b to be the projectors onto an orthonormal eigenbasis ofΓ. 
